Previous research into workers compensation risk-financing choices has considered only the alternatives of risk transfer in the form of full insurance and risk retention in the form of self-insurance. However, self-insurance is only one of two forms of risk retention. How determinants influence the choice of the other form of risk retention, the large-deductible plan, was not examined in prior research. This study empirically examines all three risk-financing choices for public entities, using a sample of Texas school districts and their workers compensation coverage decisions. It finds that some determinants contribute differently to the two risk-retention choices: severity of loss, cost of insurance, and size of firm influence the choices of these two programs in opposite directions, relative to the choice of full insurance. Also, cost of insurance and frequency of losses were found to influence the choice of full insurance in the opposite direction from that expected. That these findings fail to agree with expectations suggests a need to refine the theory to differentiate between the two risk-retention programs, especially for public entities.
INTRODUCTION
Previous research into factors influencing firms' risk-financing choices for workers compensation (WC) coverage considered only two alternatives: full insurance and self-insurance (Goshay, 1964; Gaunt and McDonald, 1977; and Butler and Worrall, 1993) . Although full insurance is a form of risk transfer, self-insurance is only one of two forms of risk retention. Determinants influencing the choice of the other form of risk retention, the aggregate-deductible plan, 1 were not examined in prior research.
This article uses a sample of Texas school districts to examine all three risk-financing choices, including an aggregate-deductible plan.
Because micro data for risk-financing analysis has proven scarce, only a small body of work exists in this area. Butler and Worrall (1993) , who used macro data for such an analysis, pointed out that "if one had data on self-insurance at the firm level and proxies for the associated costs of insuring, . . . then the estimated probability of selfinsuring would be straightforward." This study takes advantage of micro data concerning WC coverage of Texas school districts from the Texas Association of School Boards (TASB) WC fund and the Texas Education Agency (TEA).
Traditional risk-management theory holds that risk-financing choices are determined by the following five predictors: frequency of losses, severity of losses, financial capacity (or wealth), size of the firm, and cost of insurance. 3 The choice of risk retention is expected to be most strongly associated with low loss severity, combined with either low or high loss frequency. The choice of risk transfer is expected to be most strongly associated with a combination of high severity and low frequency of losses. When both loss severity and loss frequency are high, a firm is expected to avoid the risk altogether (see Figure 1 ). Larger firm size, greater financial capacity (wealth), and higher cost of insurance are expected to contribute to the choice of retaining risk.
FIGURE 1 The Risk Management Matrix
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Retention Retention (loss prevention) (4) (3) Source: Rejda (1997) ; Pritchett, Schmit, Doerpinghaus, and Athearn (1996) ; and Vaughan and Vaughan (1995) .
Contrary to traditional risk management theory, which bundles the two risk-retention choices, this article finds significant differences in the way the determinants enumerated above influence the choice of self-insurance and an aggregate-deductible plan. The results of multinomial logit regression models for the years 1992 and 1993 and derivative semi-elasticity estimates reveal a marked difference in how these variables influence the two risk-retention choices, relative to the full-insurance choice.
The following results expose the widely differing effects of some determinants on the two risk-retention alternatives:
• Severity: Contrary to expectations, severity of losses contributes positively to the choice of self-insurance while contributing negatively to the choice of an aggregate-deductible plan, as expected.
• Cost: Cost of insurance contributes positively to the choice of self-insurance, as expected, but contributes negatively to the choice of an aggregate-deductible plan, against expectations.
Other results run contrary to expectations concerning the choice of full insurance:
• Cost: Cost contributes positively to the choice of full insurance.
• Frequency of losses: Frequency of losses contributes positively to the choice of full insurance.
The results regarding size confirm the expectation that size is positively associated with the choice of self-insurance. The results regarding financial capacity are statistically weak but show moderate support for the hypothesis that financial capacity associates positively with the choice of self-insurance. The results are inconclusive for aggregate-deductible plans and full insurance.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: the next section provides background information. The hypotheses are developed in the section of the same name, and the section entitled "Empirical Model" provides a description of the model. The section entitled "The Data" includes discussions of the data and univariate comparative analysis of the determinants affecting the three risk-financing choice patterns.
Results of the multinomial logit models are featured in the section entitled "Multinomial Logit Models Results." The last section provides the summary and conclusion.
BACKGROUND
The availability of three risk-financing choices in the WC market for Texas school districts has been a relatively recent development. Until the early 1990s, self-insurance and full coverage in the TASB WC pool were the only available choices.
WC is not mandatory in Texas except for public entities, which have been required by law to provide coverage since the early 1970s. In 1974, responding to the lack of availability from the commercial insurance market, TASB created a WC public risk pool, one of the largest for school districts in the nation. The pool used the statepromulgated rates with a 25 percent discount to price each district's contribution. It served most of the 1,060 Texas school districts until the early 1990s, when it began losing membership (see Table 2 ) as a result of a reported deficit of more than $100 million 4 and a new aggregate-deductible plan offered by a new competing pool. As a result of the deficit, 5 TASB's WC pool abandoned its old pricing system in favor of experience-modifier factors (EMF). Houston Chronicle, Business Section, August 4, 1991. 5 As of June 1990, the accounting guidelines for self-insuring governmental entities and public pools under GASB 10 (www.nan.shh.fi/raw/gasb/welcome.htm) required pools to project ultimate losses on claims and provide additional financial statement disclosures about reserves. TASB has always booked ultimate losses on claims. The cause of TASB's pool deficit has been regarded as overly conservative actuarial adjustments at a time of increasing losses during a downturn in the Texas economy. Subsequently, more stringent actuarial requirements changed the operation of the pool. As of this writing, the pool is enjoying a surplus. 6 EMF reflects the actual loss experience of an individual employer relative to other similarly classified employers in the state. They are used to calculate WC rates. In these turbulent years, school districts unable to escape the escalating WC costs 8 required by TASB began seeking alternatives. Despite their ability to obtain thirdparty administrative services (TPA) for self-insurance from the TASB pool, some districts opted to seek the services of outside TPA providers. Other districts opted for the aggregate-deductible plan offered by the new competing pool, or they exercised the full-insurance option in other pools.
As the defections from TASB's WC pool surpassed the levels needed to return the pool to health, the pool administrators acknowledged the need to develop programs to bring the districts back to the pool and its TPA services. TASB's offering its own aggregate-deductible plan in 1992 represented a major step toward this goal.
The movement of Texas school districts among the three risk-financing alternatives in the early 1990s was unprecedented. These changes offer an excellent window for research in this area. It can be assumed that the intense activity shown in Table 2 reflects dynamic decision making, as opposed to a passive continuation of the status quo.
HYPOTHESES
As noted above, the basic risk and insurance textbooks consider risk-financing choices to be influenced by loss severity, loss frequency, firm size, financial capacity, and the cost of insurance. The following are the traditional hypotheses concerning the effects of each of these determinants on risk-financing choices:
H1: Severity and frequency of losses
As depicted in Figure 1 , lower loss severity (loss per claim) contributes to the choice to retain the risk ( Figure 1 , quadrants 3 and 4), independent of loss frequency (claims per employee). 9 There is no clear differentiation in the theory between self-insurance and large-deductible plans under the risk-retention programs. The risk-management matrix also shows that higher loss severity contributes to the choice of full insurance when loss frequency is low ( Figure 1 , quadrant 4). Simultaneously high loss frequency and severity result in risk avoidance ( Figure 1 , quadrant 1). Avoidance, however, is not an option available to school districts. 7 The Texas Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1989 affected both WC and insurance laws. Public entities, although not subject to insurance regulation, were affected by the changes in the WC laws. 8 In 1991, for example, the Houston Chronicle reported that the Pearland Independent School District had seen an increase in annual required contributions from $280,000 to $600,000 between 1990 and 1991. (See L.M. Sixel, "Schools' comp fund in red -If plan fails, burden would fall on taxpayers," Houston Chronicle, Business Section, August 4, 1991.) 9 Retention of risk almost always includes coverage for catastrophic losses to avoid an absolute disaster (Goshay, 1964, and Gaunt and McDonald, 1977) .
H2: Firm size
Goshay (1964) and Gaunt and McDonald (1977) found firm size to be a distinguishing factor in the choice to self-insure. The law of large numbers dictates that a larger number of exposures reduce the risk associated with unpredictability or uncertainty of future losses. 10 For this reason, reinsurers do not provide catastrophic stop-loss coverage to small entities, making size critical for obtaining it.
11 Therefore, when an entity has enough exposures to predict future losses accurately, it is more likely to self-insure. The contribution of firm size to the choice of an aggregate-deductible plan is not clear.
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H3: Financial Capacity
Prior research suggests that when financial capacity is low, entities rely on full insurance to guarantee the cost of risk (Beam and McFadden, 1998) . 13 Wealthier entities prefer to use their funds than to transfer them to a third party for insurance. Therefore, they would rather self-insure. The influence of financial capacity on the choice of an aggregate-deductible plan is not as clear. Poorer districts may opt for the lower upfront cost of an aggregate-deductible plan in the hope of limiting their losses to less than the deductible amount (the attachment point). Under that scenario, poorer districts would prefer aggregate-deductible plans to full insurance.
H4: Cost
As noted in the basic risk and insurance texts, cost must be economically feasible for the insureds to obtain full insurance and transfer the risk to a third party.
14 It is expected that higher cost would increase the likelihood of retaining the risk, all else being equal. Therefore, higher cost should contribute to the choice of self-insurance or an aggregate-deductible plan positively and contribute negatively to the choice of full insurance. Table 1 summarizes the expected contribution of each determinant to each risk-financing choice.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
The empirical model best suited for estimating the probability of the selection of one of three alternatives is the multinomial logit model described by Kmenta (1986) . In the multinomial logit model, the choice between two alternatives is assumed to be made independently of the remaining third choice. 15 Here, the two alternatives are self-insurance and the aggregate-deductible plan. The model is specified as follows: The multinomial logit model is:
where x i are the determinants contributing to the choice. Here, they are severity, frequency, size, two measures of financial capacity, and, in one model, EMF, used as a proxy to the cost of insurance.
Therefore, for any j alternative, 
where α β
This is a normalization process that positions the first alternative (the choice of full insurance) as the benchmark for comparison. The parameters of the multinomial logit model are estimated by the maximum likelihood method, based on the following log likelihood function:
Maximizing equation (5) yields estimates of the parameters β j for two choices, selfinsurance and aggregate deductible, relative to the omitted choice, full insurance. Source: Beam and McFadden (1998); Rejda (1997); Pritchett, Schmit, Doerpinghaus, and Athearn (1996); and Vaughan and Vaughan (1995) .
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16 The standard errors are computed as the square root of the diagonal elements of the matrix Because the coefficients of the multinomial logit function do not provide the marginal effects of each determinant on the risk-financing choices, the coefficients are converted into measures of marginal effects, as described in Butler, Johnson, and Baldwin (1995) . These "semi-elasticity estimates" are computed as follows:
for j = 3 .
In equations (6a) and (6b), k and j are indices across the three risk-financing alternatives, and m is an index across the determinants in X i . The calculation of the standard error follows Butler, Johnson and Baldwin (1995) .
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THE DATA
Observations
As described above, because of the defection of school districts from TASB's WC pool, the sample of school districts with loss data decreased throughout the study period. Table 2 shows the declining numbers of members in the TASB's WC pool and TPA services from 1991 through 1993 (from 832 to 438), when other pools and TPA services experienced an increase from 110 to 504 members. The table includes only 89 per cent of the school districts in Texas, since some non-TASB pool participants did not respond to TASB's survey of providers.
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The largest migration into the self-insurance program occurred in 1991 and 1992, while the largest migration into the aggregate-deductible plan occurred in 1992 and 1993. The number of observations available for analysis of the 1993 risk-financing choice is provided in Table 3 . Loss data are available for 22 districts choosing selfinsurance, 104 choosing an aggregate deductible, and 422 choosing full insurance. For analysis including the cost of insurance, proxied by EMF, there are even fewer observations. calculations are uniform for all districts and use the NCCI methodology, which gives greater weight to the frequency of accidents than the actual dollar amounts those accidents may cost. 21 Here, revenue is the product of the tax rate and property value per student, plus state aid.
Determinants
Tax rate and property value per student are not used as separate determinants here because it appears that the revenue-per-student predictor captures the whole effect of the other two. In a separate multinomial logit model, the log of the tax rate and the log of the property value per student were used. A test of the contrasts of maximum-likelihood estimates failed to reject equality, and the two predictors appear to be insignificantly different from each other. Thus, the predictor of revenue per student was used. and cost is TASB's WC pool, while the size and financial capacity data are from TEA.
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Averages of frequency and severity of losses are provided for periods greater than one year (except for 1989) to mitigate for any jumps in any one year. Because actual cost was not available for the districts that did not use the full-insurance option of the pool, EMF was selected as the best available proxy to differentiate among the rates that would have been charged had all of the districts chosen the same full-insurance program.
20
Size is measured by the number of full-time employees (FTE) in a district, since WC covers employees. Two separate proxies are used for financial capacity: the first is the percentage of students enrolled in the school free-lunch program, which is a measure of poverty; the second is revenue per student. Table 3 shows that the self-insuring districts were relatively large, with the highest severity and frequency of losses and the highest cost, as measured by EMF. On the other side of the spectrum, it appears that the aggregate-deductible districts are the smallest districts, characterized by the lowest frequency and severity of losses and the lowest EMF. The aggregate-deductible districts do not appear to be the poorest districts; they had greater average revenue per student than the self-insuring districts had from 1989 to 1993, and similar levels of students in the school free-lunch program. The determinants of the fully insured districts appear to fit in the middle of the spectrum.
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Hypotheses H1 and H4 are not met, since the univariate analysis of Table 3 shows that (a) the self-insuring districts experience the highest severity of losses, (b) the aggregate-deductible districts are faced with the lowest cost of insurance (EMF), and (c) the fully insured districts have higher frequency of losses than the aggregatedeductible districts have.
The univariate analysis results regarding size appear to agree with expectations for the self-insuring districts, but the results regarding financial capacity are not conclusive.
In line with expectations, the financial capacity proxy of the percentage of students in the school free-lunch program is consistently lower for self-insuring districts, but the average revenue per student measure reflects a different pattern.
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T-tests comparing each two choices reveal statistically significant differences between the determinants for each two choices. Also, the differences among the three riskfinancing choices appear statistically significant for all determinants in most cases, as the chi-square approximation of the Wilcoxon tests shows (Table 3 ). The multinomial logistic regression models that follow add more clarity of the combined contributions of the determinants to the three risk-financing choices.
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODELS RESULTS
The multinomial logit model parameter estimates of the determinants affecting the risk-financing alternatives of self-insurance and aggregate-deductible plans, relative to full insurance, are shown in Table 4 for 1993 and 1992. 23 In 1993, two models are shown; model A includes the EMF predictor, while model B excludes it. For 1993 model A, the chi-square test indicates that the only statistically significant explanatory variables are size and EMF. Relative to the missing choice of full insurance, the parameter estimate of EMF is negative for the aggregate-deductible choice, implying that lower prices influence the choice of an aggregate-deductible plan, contrary to 22 The low revenue per student of the self-insuring districts may be explained by the lower taxable value per student (despite the higher tax rate), the larger number of students in these districts, and the lower level of state aid. The average taxable value per student in 1993 was $172,184 in the self-insuring districts, $219,120 in the aggregate-deductible districts and $252,988 in fully insured districts. The average tax rates in 1993 were 1.34 percent, 1.21 percent, and 1.23 percent, respectively, and the average number of students in 1993 was 15,514, 1,012, and 1,637, respectively. 23 1991 (the year of TASB's WC pool deficit and the introduction of the aggregate-deductible plan by the competing pool) is not presented here because of space limitations and because external effects may have influenced the choice in addition to the determinants studied here.
expectations in H4. The parameter estimate for EMF is positive for the self-insurance choice, implying that all else being equal, cost affects the choice of self-insurance positively, as expected.
Comparison of the 1993 models A and B indicates that frequency and severity are statistically significant predictors of choice only when EMF is not included. Because EMF is a function of frequency 24 and severity, 25 it might initially appear that they, too, could be used as proxies for cost. 26 However, tests contrasting the maximum likelihood parameter estimate rejected equality between severity and EMF at the .01 significance level, and between frequency and EMF at the .10 significance level. Thus, frequency and severity are not substitutes for EMF.
The results of the 1992 multinomial logit model (without EMF, because there are not enough observations for the aggregate-deductible alternative) appear mostly similar to that of the 1993 model B, with the exception of the predictor of percentage of students in the school free-lunch program, which is statistically significant only in 1992, but not in 1993. The most notable results of Table 4 for the comparison between selfinsurance and aggregate-deductible choices only (full insurance is the hidden choice) are as follows: (1) severity contributes positively to the choice to self-insure, contrary to expectations, and contributes negatively to the choice of an aggregate-deductible plan, as expected; (2) frequency contributes negatively to the choices of self-insurance and aggregate-deductible plans, as hypothesized; (3) EMF contributes positively to the choice to self-insure, as expected, and contributes negatively to the choice of an aggregate-deductible plan, contrary to expectations; (4) size contributes positively to the choice to self-insure, as expected; and (5) the financial capacity proxies provide no strong, conclusive results concerning aggregate-deductible plans. The proxies contribute to the self-insurance choice in the expected directions, but only the freelunch proxy in the 1992 model produces a statistically significant result.
The results shown in Table 4 for both 1992 and 1993 illustrate on a multivariate level the opposing influences of the explanatory variables on the choices of selfinsurance and aggregate-deductible plans only. Because full insurance is omitted, Table 4 does not give a complete picture of the relative marginal effects of the different determinants on the probability of selecting each of the three risk-financing choices. These effects are illustrated in Table 5 , which shows the semi-elasticity estimates. 27 The effects of frequency and EMF on the full-insurance choice are especially pronounced.
The semi-elasticity estimates for frequency strikingly contradict H1 for the full-insurance choice. Frequency contributes positively to the choice of full insurance (0.68 in the 1993 model A, 2.02 in the 1993 model B, and 2.5 in the 1992 model), contrary to expectations. The influence of cost (EMF) on the choice of full insurance is also surprisingly contrary to the expectation expressed in H4: the probability of selecting full insurance increases by 0.45 as price increases. 24 Frequency is the average claim per employee for the three years before the choice. 25 Severity is the average loss per claim for the three years before the choice. 26 Simple correlations between EMF and severity and between EMF and frequency indicate correlation of up to 48 percent for severity and EMF and 44 percent for frequency and EMF. 27 As explained by Butler, Johnson, and Baldwin (1995) , the standard errors of the semi-elasticity measures are not stable. The chi-squares of the determinants in Table 4 are used here.
Although the semi-elasticity estimates for the effect of severity on the choice of selfinsurance and aggregate-deductible plans fall in opposite directions in the 1992 and 1993 models of Table 5 , the semi-elasticity measures for full insurance are not consistent between models.
The results regarding the contribution of size to the choices of self-insurance and aggregate-deductible are similar to those in Table 4 . The interpretation of the influence of size on each choice using the semi-elasticity estimates indicates that the probability of using self-insurance increases by 2.7 and 2.2 in the 1993 models A and B, respectively, and 1.9 in the 1992 model. The probability of selecting full insurance declines with size in all three models, while the direction of the contribution of size to the choice of an aggregate-deductible plan is not consistent across all models in Table 5 .
There are unclear results for the contributions of the financial capacity proxies used to evaluate H3 for the choices of full insurance and the aggregate-deductible plans. However, the results for the self-insurance choice seem to have some consistency. Greater wealth, proxied by revenue per student, appears to contribute positively to the choice to self-insure, as expected, and the proxy of students on free lunch also contributes in the expected direction. It may be that the influence of financial capacity requires further investigation. Because school districts are public entities with taxation authority, the significance of financial capacity may not always parallel its significance in the private sector.
CONCLUSION
The findings in this article provide surprising insights into some entrenched riskfinancing hypotheses. Although most determinants are expected to influence the two risk-retention programs similarly, unbundling the self-insurance and aggregate-deductible programs and examining them as separate risk-financing choices show significant differences. The determinants of severity of loss, cost of insurance, and size position these two programs on either side of the choice of full insurance. These findings are clearly evident from both simple univariate analysis and more complex multinomial logit models and their semi-elasticity estimate derivatives.
Although large-deductible plans do seem to support the traditional risk management matrix of severity and frequency, self-insurance does not. On the other hand, the self-insurance program seems to support the cost hypothesis, while the aggregate-deductible program does not. Weak results regarding the positive influence of wealth on the choice of self-insurance and inconsistent results regarding the effect on the other two choices from two proxies for financial capacity suggest that further investigation is required.
The contribution of determinants to the two risk-retention choices are thus quite dissimilar. That these findings fail to agree with expectations suggests a need to refine the theory to differentiate between the two risk retention programs, especially for public entities. 
